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Courtroom architecture 
in the 21st century
Governments around the world 
are rethinking the function and 
design of courts. This is partly 
in response to budget cuts and 
austerity measures, and partly 
because of changing beliefs about 
what a court should look like. 
For instance, Her Majesty’s Court 
and Tribunal Service has recently 
announced an ambitious overhaul 
of the court estate across England 
and Wales, with the closure of 
86 courts and tribunals as well 
as significant investment in new 
technologies. This has led to a re-
thinking about court design, with 
proposed ‘justice hubs’ or ‘pop-
up’ courts located within other 
buildings. A similar undertaking is 
currently underway in Ireland. In 
France, the centrally-located (on 
high-value land) Palais de Justice is 
to be moved further outside the city 
to a new high-rise court complex 
that boldly re-imagines what a 
court should look like. In these new 
plans, the aim is to develop justice 
spaces that can promote access to 
justice, democratic participation, 
and a more efficient system while 
at the same time providing security 
for all users.   
We often think that courts embody 
immemorial tradition, with their 
we ighty  symbo l s  and  r i tua l s 
of state power and authority. 
However,  a  c lose look at  the 
history of legal architecture reveals 
fluid and dynamic conceptions 
of court houses and court rooms. 
But, as Linda Mulcahy argues in 
her book on legal architecture, 
while modern trends in justice 
have been towards increased 
transparency, due process, and 
democracy, courts have actually 
become more confining and less 
democratic spaces. This can be 
seen most clearly in the criminal 
courtroom with the use of the dock 
for the placement of the accused 
at trial. Originally a holding pen for 
defendants held in cells below the 
court, docks soon developed into a 
segregated space for the accused 
to sit in the courtroom, traditionally 
a wooden box not dissimilar to a 
witness box or a jury box. In the 
past twenty years or so, docks have 
further evolved to include a more 
‘secure’ variety which enclose the 
accused in glass so that they are 
completely separated from the 
rest of the courtroom. Such docks 
can now be found in courtrooms 
throughout much of the world, in 
countries with both common law 
and civil law traditions. Notable 
exceptions to this rule include the 
Scandinavian countries and the 
United States, which both sit the 
accused beside their lawyer at the 
bar table, as anyone familiar with 
crime dramas from these countries 
would recall. On the other end 
o f  the  spect rum,  Russ ia  and 
several Eastern European countries 
routinely place defendants in docks 
surrounded by metal bars or mesh 
cages. We are familiar with this 
from the widely-circulated images 
of Pussy Riot in the dock during 
their trial in Moscow in 2012 (and 
here in a glass dock).     
Isolating the accused in this way 
undermines their right to a fair 
trial and their right to dignified 
treatment.  Given the current 
re-imagining of court buildings 
and courtrooms, it now seems a 
fitting time to revisit the peculiar 
persistence of docks in criminal 
proceedings.  
What’s wrong with the 
dock?
There are three main arguments 
against the use of docks. The 
first has to do with the abil ity 
to hear proceedings and enjoy 
regular access to counsel. When 
segregated from the rest of the 
court, it can be hard to follow 
what is going on, to be seen and 
heard, and to consult with one’s 
lawyer. Early challenges to the dock 
centred on this, including cases 
from the seventeenth century, 
found in the Old Bailey Archives, 
where defendants would regularly 
request that they come out of the 
dock so that they can hear the case 
against them. This is the argument 
that eventually led to the decline of 
docks in America, beginning with 
cases such as Commonwealth v 
Boyd (1914) where a Pennsylvania 
court decided that, as a general 
principle, a defendant has a right 
to sit with counsel at the bar table. 
These developments foreshadowed 
arguments put forward to the 
European Court of Human Rights 
in the 1990s, where it was argued 
that confinement in a secure dock 
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to hear at trial. 
The second issue with docks is 
that they might undermine the 
presumption of innocence, a right 
that is a cornerstone of modern 
legal practice. This argument has 
been made in several American 
cases over the course of the 20th 
century, with one US Appeal Court 
Judge, who agreed that docks 
are "an anachronism in a modern 
criminal trial which could have been 
abandoned years ago," concluded 
that: 
‘The practice of isolating the 
accused in a four-foot-high 
box very well may affect a 
juror's objectivity. Confinement 
in a prisoner dock focuses 
attention on the accused and 
may create the impression 
that he is somehow different 
or dangerous. By treating 
the accused in this distinctive 
manner, a juror may be 
influenced throughout 
the trial.’
In the UK, both the Law Society 
and the Howard League for Penal 
Reform launched campaigns to 
abolish the dock in the 1960s and 
1970s, drawing on arguments 
about fairness and due process. 
They were unable to achieve any 
legislative change, in part because 
of an increas ing emphasis  on 
security. The secure glassed-in dock 
has raised further alarm bells, with 
a Judge in Australia ordering them 
removed from his court during a 
high-profile terrorism trial because 
he believed that they added a ‘layer 
of prejudice’ to the proceedings 
(full details about this case can be 
found here.) 
The final argument against the 
dock is that it does not constitute 
dignified treatment. The European 
Court of Human Rights has heard 
cases arguing that both glass and 
metal docks violate the prohibition 
on degrading treatment enshrined 
in  Ar t i c le  3  of  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
Most recently, in the 2014 case of 
Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia, 
the defendants claimed that their 
containment in a dock surrounded 
by metal bars was akin to being 
‘a monkey in a zoo.’ The Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR ruled that 
the ‘objectively degrading nature’ 
of caged docks are ‘incompatible 
with the standards of civi l ised 
behaviour that are the hallmark of 
a democratic society.’
Each of the arguments outlined 
above rely on legal opinion in 
making the case against the dock. 
That is, they rely on what judges 
think the accused might experience. 
In the next section, I discuss social 
science research that empirically 
examines the placement of the 
accused at trial.  
Empirical research
In 2014 my research collaborators 
and I conducted an experiment 
testing the second of the above 
a r g u m e n t s  -  t h a t  t h e  d o c k 
undermines the presumption of 
innocence. This was funded by 
the Australian Research Council in 
partnership with the New South 
Wales Department of Justice and 
the Western Australia Department 
of Justice. We used a real criminal 
courtroom in Sydney to simulate 
a terrorism trial- it was a similar 
c o u r t ro o m  a n d  w i t h  s i m i l a r 
ev idence  that  the  Aust ra l ian 
judge discussed in the previous 
section presided over. We brought 
in jury-eligible Australian citizens 
to  ac t  a s  mock- ju ro r s  in  our 
trial. Professional actors played 
the role of judge, prosecutor, 
defence, accused, and witnesses. 
After each trial jurors retired to 
del iberate and then vote on a 
verdict. 
We repeated this trial many times 
so that in the end, over 400 mock-
jurors were able to take part. 
Each time, the trial was exactly 
the same- same evidence, same 
testimony, same actors, spoken in 
the same say. The only thing that 
was different was that 1/3 of the 
time the accused was placed in a 
traditional dock open to the public, 
⅓ of the time he was placed behind 
glass in a secure dock, and ⅓ of 
the time he was with his lawyer 
at the bar table. The strength 
of this design is that if there is a 
difference between groups in terms 
of how jurors voted, we could be 
reasonably sure that this was due to 
the location of the accused.
Our results support the hypothesis 
that the dock is prejudicial. Jurors 
who saw the accused sit at the 
bar table voted guilty 33% of the 
time. When he sat in an open dock 
jurors reached a verdict of guilty 
47% of the time and in the secure 
dock 46% of the time. There is no 
statistically significant difference in 
guilty verdicts between the open 
and secure dock, but there is a 
statistically significant difference 
between the bar table and either of 
the docks. That is, any isolation of 
the accused seems to be prejudicial. 
Again, because everything else 
about the trial was exactly the 
same, we can feel confident that 
this difference in verdict is due to 
the impact of the dock. 
Courts of the future? 
We were surprised to find that 
both the open dock and the secure 
dock were equally prejudicial. 
Given this finding, along with the 
European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisprudence about participation 
and dignity, we think that docks 
should no longer be used at trial. 
In 2015, JUSTICE publ ished a 
report on the dock, drawing on our 
research to make this same case.
A likely challenge is that docks are 
presumed to be needed to ensure 
security at court. Yet Scandinavian 
cou r t s  and  Amer i can  cou r t s 
experience significant security risks, 
and they seem to manage without 
docks (and, contrary to popular 
belief, most American courts are 
not full of armed police officers). 
Courts are already undergoing a 
significant change and courts of 
the future are likely to be flexible 
spaces that serve multiple functions 
and rely heavily on technology for 
communication, administration, 
and evidence presentation. Sound 
design principles and enhanced 
technology (for instance, to enable 
high-quality remote participation 
for parties) can ensure that courts 
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